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Misrepresentation and Misappropriation
Two Common Principles or Common ‘Basic Moral Feelings’  
of Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition Law
Dirk Visser
In this article it is submitted that misrepresentation and misappropriation are 
the two most important common prin ciples, or common ‘basic moral feelings’ 
of intellectual property and unfair competition law in Europe and elsewhere.
It is also fully acknow ledged that free trade, free speech, anti-trust law, legal 
certainty and the general need to be able to use and take advantage of existing 
work and ingenuity of others, are vital countervailing prin ciples which deter-
mine the very important limitations and exceptions in intellectual property and 
unfair competition law to a large extend. These vital countervailing prin ciples, 
however, are not discussed here.
“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what 
I mean by the law.“1
The difference between legal academics on the one hand and judges and legal 
advisors on the other, is that the latter actually have to decide cases or predict 
what these decisions are likely to be or going to be. In order to make decisions 
all people (including judges) ultimately need some kind of emotional convic-
tion that they should make a particular choice. A feeling that in a certain case 
a certain decision is preferable. Without such a feeling a person cannot decide 
anything. In fact, it has been proven that people with a particular kind of brain 
damage which blocks their emotional mental capacities cannot decide anything: 
they keep on weighing different possibilities against one another, without be-
ing able to decide.2
Thus, anyone who has to decide anything, including judges, ultimately needs 
some kind of feeling of emotional conviction that makes them decide. Therefore, 
in this essay, the phrase ‘common prin ciples’ is sometimes used interchangeably 
with common ‘basic moral feelings’ of intellectual property, because the author 
is convinced that there is an important moral-emotional side to rules and deci-
sions in intellectual property law.
1 Holmes, Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L.R. 457, 460–61 (1897).
2 Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (1994).
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I. Misrepresentation
Misrepresentation is without doubt the less controversial of the two prin ciples 
which will be discussed here.
Misrepresentation is the basis for the English tort of passing off and is based 
on the prin ciple against deceit and the rules against cheating. Deceit and cheat-
ing destabilize human interaction and society. If there is no trust and if you can 
not rely on others, there can be no cooperation and no exchange of goods, ser-
vices and ideas will take place.
“A man is not to sell his own goods under the pretence that they are the goods of an-
other man. He cannot therefore be allowed to use names, marks, letters or other indicia, 
by which he may induce purchasers to believe, that the goods which he is selling are the 
manu facture of another person”3
Misrepresentation is the basis of the prohibition on creating confusion in all 
trade mark laws, regulations, directives and treaties.4 Misrepresentation is the 
basis of the prohibition on creating confusion in rules (including directives5 and 
treaties6) against unfair competition.
Misrepresentation is also an important basis of the rules against plagiarism. 
There can be little doubt that the prohibition of misrepresentation is a common 
(European or even universal) prin ciple of IP and unfair competition law.
II. Misappropriation
Misappropriation is a concept which often occurs together with misrepresen-
tation, but which is clearly distinct from it, because it typically does not re-
quire any misleading of, or confusion on the part of the public. In fact, for 
3 Lord Langdale MR in Perry v. Truefitt, (1842) 6 Beav. 66; 49 ER 749.
4 Article 16 TRIPs.
5 Article 6 (2)(a) a of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive reads as follows:
2. A commercial practice shall also be regarded as misleading if, in its factual context, tak-
ing account of all its features and circumstances, it causes or is likely to cause the average con-
sumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise, and it involves: 
(a) any marketing of a product, including comparative advertising, which creates confusion 
with any products, trade marks, trade names or other distinguishing marks of a competitor.
6 Article 10bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Unfair 
Competition):
(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure to nationals of such countries effective 
protection against unfair competition.
(2) Any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial mat-
ters constitutes an act of unfair competition.
(3) The following in particular shall be prohibited:
1. all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means whatever with the establish-
ment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor.
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misappropriation to occur, the state of mind of the public as such is not re-
levant at all.
The concept of misappropriation can be illustrated very well with the ex-
ample of the L’Oréal/Bellure-decision of the European Court of Justice. In that 
case, the ECJ ruled on the meaning of taking unfair advantage of the reputation 
of a trademark in article 5 (2) of the European Trademark Directive 89/1047 in 
a case on smell-a-likes.
The ECJ ruled “that the taking of unfair advantage of the distinctive char-
acter or the repute of a mark, within the meaning of that provision, does not 
require that there be a likelihood of confusion or a likelihood of detriment to 
the distinctive character or the repute of the mark or, more generally, to its pro-
prietor” (emphasis added). In other words, no (proof of) misrepresentation is 
required.8
Moreover, the Court decided (in § 49) that:
– where a third party attempts,
– through the use of a sign similar to a mark with a reputation,
– to ride on the coat-tails of that mark in order to benefit from its power of at-
traction, its reputation and its prestige, and to exploit,
– without paying any financial compensation and
– without being required to make efforts of his own in that regard,
– the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of that mark in order to 
 create and maintain the image of that mark,
– the advantage resulting from such use must be considered to be an advantage 
that has been unfairly taken of the distinctive character or the repute of that 
mark.
The L’Oréal/Bellure-decision has been criticised, among other things, for not 
taking into account (the importance of) countervailing prin ciples such as free-
dom of information, and more specifically the need to inform consumers as to 
the nature of the product and freedom of comparative advertising.9 This criti-
cism might well be legitimate; if one takes the position that it is not forbidden to 
make and sell a copy of a perfume, why would it then be forbidden to commu-
nicate to the public the fact that you are selling copies of a particular perfume?10 
7 First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of 
the Member States relating to trade marks, OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1.
8 ECJ, case C-487/07, L’Oréal v. Bellure, [2009, not yet published in ECR].
9 See for instance: Kur/Bently/Ohly, Sweet Smells and a Sour Taste – The ECJ’s L’Oréal 
decision (August 17, 2009). Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & 
Tax Law Research Paper No. 09–12. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492032.
10 In this respect, it should be noted that the much criticised Lancôme v. Kecofa-decision 
of the Dutch Supreme Court of 16 June 2006 (NJ 2006, 585) that perfumes can be protected 
by copy right, does make more sense from a systematic point of view. That it is not permitted 
to make or sell a copy of a (new and original) perfume sounds more straightforward than the 
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But that is not the point here, as the importance of taking countervailing prin-
ciples into account, is not denied here.11 The point is that the L’Oréal/Bellure-
decision demonstrates that the European Court of Justice is clearly lead by a 
basic moral conviction or feeling against parasitism.
It can be maintained that, in general, the concept of misappropriation in intel-
lectual property amounts to the basic moral feeling that:
– where a third party attempts,
– through the use of an object C similar to an object B
– to ride on the coat-tails of that object B in order to benefit from its goodwill, 
and to exploit,
– without paying any financial compensation and
– without being required to make efforts of his own in that regard,
– the […] effort expended by the proprietor of object B in order to create and 
maintain goodwill of object B,
– the advantage resulting from such use must be considered to be an advantage 
that has been unfairly taken of object B.
Usually there will be harm or detriment to the proprietor, often there will be 
a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, but that is not required for 
misappropriation to exist.
Another example of what is meant by misappropriation is the International 
News Service v. Associated Press decision12 of the US Supreme Court.
Associated Press used on the West Coast of the US all the news about the 
First World War which International News Service had collected at great ex-
pense through its correspondents in Europe and had published on the East 
Coast. Associated Press did not literally copy the news articles, but they copied 
all of the facts in those articles.
There is no copy right in news or news facts as such. “But one who gathers 
news at pains and expense, for the purpose of lucrative publication, may be said 
to have a quasi-property in the results of his enterprise as against a rival in the 
same business, and the appropriation of those results at the expense and to the 
damage of the one and for the profit of the other is unfair competition against 
which equity will afford relief”.
position that it is permitted to make and sell a copy of a (new and original) perfume, but that 
it is parasitic and amounts to unfair competition or trademark infringement to let it be known 
that you are selling such a copy.
11 A reference to such a countervailing prin ciple might for instance be found in Recital 14, 
Sentence 6, of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC): “It is not the inten-
tion of this Directive to reduce consumer choice by prohibiting the promotion of products 
which look similar to other products unless this similarity confuses consumers as to the com-
mercial origin of the product and is therefore misleading”.
12 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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It is all about misappropriation, unjust enrichment or: “You shall not reap 
where you have not sown”.13 This is the core and ‘gut feeling’ of IP protection 
and unfair competition law.14
This is the emotional basis of patent law, copy right, trademark, design and 
database protection. This is the basis of the tort of passing off, the misappro-
priation doctrine and civil law protection against ‘concurrence parasitaire’, ‘un-
lauteres wettbewerb’ and ‘slaafse nabootsing’ (slavish imitation). It is the basic 
moral feeling against free riding and parasitism.
Amongst legal scholars, especially in the United Kingdom, there will prob-
ably be a lot of opposition to the very idea that there might be something like a 
basic moral feeling or prin ciple against misappropriation because for them “imi-
tation is the life blood of competition”15 seems to be a much stronger moral feel-
ing or prin ciple.16 But even in the decision where this “imitation is the life blood 
of competition” quote comes from, it is recognised that a basic moral feeling 
against misappropriation exists:
“Hence at first glance it might seem intolerable that one manufacturer should be allowed 
to sponge on another by pirating the product of years of invention and development with-
out license or recompense and reap the fruits sown by another. Morally and ethically such 
practices strike a discordant note. It cuts across the grain of justice to permit an intruder to 
profit not only by the efforts of another but at his expense as well”.17
13 Although this sentence sounds biblical it is not, at least not in the meaning with which 
the sentence is used today. In the ‘Parable of the Pounds’ (Luke 19:11–27), the master gives 
some money to three servants and goes away. When he comes back two of the servants give 
back the money with profit and they are both generously rewarded. The third servant returns 
only the original sum, because has done nothing with the money and says: “I have kept it laid 
away in a piece of cloth. I was afraid of you, because you are a hard man. You take out what 
you did not put in and reap what you did not sow. The master answers: ‘I will judge you by 
your own words, you wicked servant! You knew, did you, that I am a hard man, taking out 
what I did not put in, and reaping what I did not sow? Why then didn’t you put my money on 
deposit, so that when I came back, I could have collected it with interest?’. He takes away all 
the money from the third servant and gives it to the servant which had made the most profit 
and makes the following curious capitalistic remark: ‘I tell you that to everyone who has, 
more will be given, but as for the one who has nothing, even what he has will be taken away’. 
The same story can be found in Matthew 25:14–30. The lesson to be learned is that have to use 
our talents well, not that we should not harvest where we have not sown.
14 Callmann, He who reaps where he has not sown: unjust enrichment in unfair com-
petition, 55 Harv. L.R. 595–614 (1942) and: Kamperman Sanders, Unfair Competition Law 
(1997).
15 American Safety Table Company v. Schreiber 269 F.2d 255 (19 June 1959), http://open 
jurist.org/269/f2d/fn7.
16 See for instance Spence, (1996) 112 LQR 472–498.
17 American Safety Table Company v. Schreiber 269 F.2d 255 (19 June 1959), http://open 
jurist.org/269/f2d/fn7, paras. 75 et seq.
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Then the Court continues:
“But this initial response to the problem has been curbed in deference to the greater pub-
lic good. […] For imitation is the life blood of competition. It is the unimpeded availability 
of substantially equivalent units that permits the normal operation of supply and demand 
to yield the fair price society must pay for a given commodity. […] Unless such duplication 
is permitted, competition may be unduly curtailed with the possible resultant develop-
ment of undesirable monopolistic conditions. The Congress, realizing such possi bilities, 
has therefore confined and limited the rewards of originality to those situations and cir-
cumstances comprehended by our patent, copy right, and trade-mark laws. When these 
statutory frameworks are inapplicable, originality per se remains unprotected and often 
unrewarded. For these reasons and with these limitations the bare imitation of another’s 
product, without more, is permissible. And this is true regardless of the fact that the courts 
have little sympathy for a wilful imitator”.
And thus, at the end the same sentiment again: “the courts have little sympathy 
for a wilful imitator”.
There is also a strong belief among IP academics in general that the only jus-
tification for IP rights is the cool and rational concept that IP rights are a ‘ne-
cessary evil’ to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries”.18
But in order to establish what is progress in the field of science, what is use-
ful and what is art, in other words: what deserves protection and what scope of 
protection does it deserve, there will always be subjective criteria with a broad 
margin of appreciation which will have to be applied by the courts by balancing 
some kind of moral feelings against other important prin ciples.
In this respect also there is no clear dividing line between IP protection and 
unfair competition law. The only difference is that with individual IP rights, 
such patent law, copy right, trademark, design and database protection, we pre-
tend to have been able to come up with a balanced system of clearly defined cri-
teria for: object, proprietor, requirements and threshold of protection, scope of 
protection, infringement, limitations and exceptions.
But as soon as we do not like the results, we either start messing up the sys-
tem from the inside (Opel/Autec)19 or mess up the system from the outside 
(Magill)20, invent new IP or quasi-IP rights (EU Database-directive, US Mis-
appropriation doctrine) or invoke or expand some tort or civil law protection 
against unlawful competition.
18 Art. 1, Sec. 8, United States Constitution.
19 In ECJ, case C-48/05, Opel v. Autec, [2007] ECR I-1017, the ECJ introduced an extra re-
quirement for trademark infringement under article 5.1(A) of the European trademark-directive 
89/104/EEC, namely that use in question “is liable to affect the functions of the trade mark”.
20 In Magill (ECJ, cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P [1995] ECR I-743) the ECJ ruled that 
under particular circumstances the exercise of copy right (in the weekly listings of television 
programmes) amounts to abuse of a dominant position.
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With unfair competition law we often admit that we are not able to come up 
with a balanced system and leave the whole matter tot the judge to determine.
At the same time, we as academics are slightly embarrassed by the fact that 
we are not able to come up with and maintain a balanced system of object, cri-
teria and limitations which provides the legal certainty the public and the econ-
omy quite reasonably expect.
Therefore, we usually vigorously pretend that there is a clear and balanced 
system of individual IP rights which can cope with everything and that only 
in very exceptional circumstances unfair competition is needed to fill or cor-
rect the few and tiny remaining gaps. Unfair competition law should always be 
treated and applied with extreme caution, we usually say.
Within individual IP rights we also force the judge to apply his gut-feeling of 
misappropriation (and misrepresentation), and cover it up with the wording re-
quired by the most recent decision by the ECJ or national supreme court. And 
if a judge cannot solve an issue satisfactorily within the system of individual IP 
rights, he goes outside this system, to invoke or expand some tort, specific le-
gislation against unfair competition or civil law protection against unlawful be-
haviour.
Inventive step, original creation, distinctive, significant difference, well 
known, individual character, substantial investment. Something worth 
protecting?21
“a fair protection for the patent proprietor” (EPC), “a substantial part” (Da-
tabase), “not a different overall impression” (Design), “substantial similarity” 
(US), “striking similarity” (US), “improper appropriation” (US). All very sub-
jective qualifications.
One experienced judge in The Netherlands identified the three P’s of IP-in-
fringement: Pretension, Parasite and Public.
Pretension: the claimant pretends to have done something that deserves 
protection. Is this pretense justi fied? Has he invented, created or invested 
enough to protect him against free-riding?
Parasite: Is the defendant a parasite? Can what the defendant does be con-
sidered free-riding? Has he made any contribution in terms of his own in-
vestment? Is there any objective need or justification for his copying, or is he 
just lazy and greedy?
21 Patent lawyers might claim that the degree of subjectivity involved when assessing pa-
tentability or patent scope is much more restricted than in unfair competition law. But in de-
fining the know ledge of “the average person skilled in the art” and in giving meaning to the 
term “inventive step” and by interpreting patent claims in accordance with “fair protection 
for the patent proprietor” they do also make many subjective normative choices culminating 
in what they deem to be worthy of protection in a particular case. 
Misrepresentation and Misappropriation
254
Public: Is there the clearly undesirable side-effect of a risk of confusion on 
the part of the public? Or may the public be mislead in some other way?
“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact” is probably the most im-
portant aspect of the law for most non-academics. The fact that “the courts have 
little sympathy for a wilful imitator” is also a reality. Basic moral feelings about 
misrepresentation and misappropriation shape sympathies and decisions, to-
gether with rational and abstract notions such as “the greater public good”. And 
basic moral feelings often prevail.
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